The major barrier to affordable housing: the State takes 33% of the price.

Balanza con casas en un plato y una etiqueta de impuestos en el otro

A structural problem: the shortage of housing and its tax burden.

Access to housing has become one of the main social problems in Spain. Demand continues to grow, but supply has stagnated. According to various reports, between 500,000 and 800,000 new homes need to be built to meet the country’s needs and curb price increases. But why is more not built?

There are many reasons, but one weighs more than is acknowledged: the tax burden borne by both the developer and the buyer.
And the most serious thing: the main beneficiary from each home sold… is the State, which between taxes, fees and taxation on profits, takes around 33% of the total price of each home.

Real case: real cost of building a home on urban land not yet developed

Let’s suppose a development of a 5-storey building with 4 homes per floor of 20 homes in total (Estimated home size 90 usable square metres, which would mean about 110 built square metres including common elements).

To simplify calculations, we will consider a buildability of 1 m²/m² (the standard in consolidated urban land). It would require an urban plot of approximately 2,200 m².

According to data from the Ministry of Housing, the average price of urban land in Spain is €175.5/m², which implies an average land cost of:

  • 💶 2,200 m² x €175.5/m² = €386,100

To this cost must be added:

  • Average urbanisation charge: €30,000 per home
  • Average construction cost: €1,100/m² for 100 m²/home = €110,000
  • Indirect costs (project, licences, technicians…): €15,000 per home
  • Taxes and fees: €93,393.82 per home
  • Net promoter margin: 15% (€50,354)

Exposing what the Administration takes:

We reveal the tax reality surrounding the construction of a home. Throughout the entire process, from purchasing the land to delivery to the final buyer, every step is taxed by different local, regional and national administrations. Nothing escapes: materials, licences, deeds, transfers, certificates… all are fiscally controlled. A tax structure that systematically increases the final price without adding direct value to the buyer.

Applying them to our example would represent 32.82% of the final home price.

1. Land acquisition

  • Property Transfer Tax (ITP) (7%) if the seller is an individual
  • VAT (21%) if the seller is a company
  • Stamp Duty on sale (AJD) (1.2%)
  • VAT on notary and registry fees (21% on tariffs)
  • Municipal capital gains tax (Plusvalía municipal) borne by the seller (estimated at €5,000)
  • Personal Income Tax (IRPF) on capital gain estimated for the land seller (23% on an estimated gain of €100,000)

2. Land replotting and urbanisation

  • Stamp Duty (AJD) on replotting (1,2%)
  • VAT on technical fees (21%)
  • Municipal urbanisation fees
  • Property tax (IBI) on the land for the time owned (estimated 3 years)

3. Construction

  • Construction tax (ICIO) (1.5%) on the Construction Budget (PEM)
  • Building licence fees (approx. 0.5%)
  • VAT on construction materials (21%)
  • VAT on technical fees (architects, site managers, engineers, insurance) at 21%

4. Legalisation and horizontal property division

  • Stamp Duty (AJD) on new build declaration (1,2%)
  • Stamp Duty (AJD) on horizontal division (1,2%)
  • VAT notary and registry for both acts (0.2%)

5. Developer taxation

  • Corporate Tax (25%) on the developer's gross profit (20%), equivalent to 5% of the home’s final price in our example.

6. Sale to the final buyer

  • VAT on home sale (10%)
  • Stamp Duty (AJD) on the sale deed (1.2%)
  • VAT on notary and registry (0.2%)

📊 Breakdown of final price per home

In the example considered, each home would have this final cost distributed as follows:

ConceptAmount (€)% of the price
Total taxes and fees (includes 5% of developer profit that goes to Treasury)110.17832,82%
Net developer profit (15%)50.35415,00%
Remaining costs (land, construction, technicians…)175.16252,18%
Estimated final price335.694100%

🧩 And if the government really wanted to solve the housing problem?

Currently, the developer — who assumes all the risk — obtains a net margin of 15% after taxes. In contrast, the Public Administrations take 32.82% in fiscal charges.
Does it make sense that the State collects more than double what those who promote and build the housing do?

Let us imagine that the State stopped viewing housing as a source of revenue and adopted two key measures:

  1. Reduce the tax burden at all stages of the process (reducing the current 32.82% to 15%).
  2. Provide fiscal incentives to developers who limit their margin to 15% before taxes, paying only 10% instead of the current 25%. (In the example, the margin was 20% before taxes).

🔎 What impact would this have on the final price in our example?
• The buyer would go from paying €335,694 a to €262,035
• A direct saving of €73,658 per dwelling
📉 This would represent a reduction of 21,94% without the need for subsidies or distorting the market.


Conclusion: without fiscal incentives and land release, there will be no affordable housing.

The State does not assume risks, it only collects revenue. Yet, it is primarily responsible for guaranteeing access to housing.
Reducing the tax burden throughout the process — including the tax on profits — is not a concession, it is a necessity.

This would enable building new homes at reasonable prices, which in turn would help contain the price of existing homes.


Access to decent housing is a right. But as long as the main beneficiary of each property sale remains the State — which does not provide land, does not assume risk, and only collects revenue — this right will remain an illusion.

Facebook
LinkedIn
X
Email
WhatsApp